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Introduction 
The importance of protection as a factor in explaining the slow development of Spain' s 
agricultural sector, if not that of the economy, has frequently been stressed in recent 
literature for the period 1891-1936. In this paper we look at three major areas of 
agricultural protection: the level of tariffs and their impact on living standards; the 
role of tariffs in determining the allocation of agricultural land between crops and 
livestock and, fmally , the question of tariffs and the sectorial distribution of labour. 
We conclude that, although agricultural tariffs contributed to what economists today 
would consider a "misallocation" of resources , there were other factors which were 
of greater importance in explaining the low level of productivity in the sector. 
1. Were levels of protection important for Spanish consumers? 
... the higher the level of GNP per capita in 1913 or 1929, the lower the 
nominal protection of agriculture. It seems that the lower-income 
countries of Eastern and Southern Europe gave heavy protection to both 
agriculture and manufacturing . I 
The Spanish economy saw some major changes in the half century or so prior to the 
Civil War. In particular, Prados de la Escosura has estimated that GDP per head 
exactly doubled between 1859/61 and 1933/35.2 This increase in GDP was 
accompanied by structural changes, with a growth in urbanization and a decline in 
agricultural employment. Yet there can be little doubt that Spain was still a poor 
country in 1936, both in absolute terms, and in comparison with other western 
European countries. Thus, real GDP per capita in 1929 in Spain was only 68 per cent 
of that achieved in ltaJy, 40 per cent of Great Britain's, 46 per cent of France's and 
57 per cent of Germany's.3 In addition, Palafox has identified other indicators - per 
I Emphasis in the original. Lindert, 1989, p.12. 
2 This is equivalent to an annual increase of 0.94 per cent. Carreras gives a more 
modest growth of 59 per cent, or an annual 0.65 per cent. Prados de la Escosura, 
1993, Table D.2. 
3 Prados de la Escosura, 1992, p.36 . 
capita conswnption of cotton and energy, nwnbers of letter or telegrams sent, and 
literacy, where Spain once more performs noticeably worse than the continent's 
leading economies.4 
Table 1 provides another indicator, this time for a wider selection of countries, and 
concentrating on an area which most interests us here, namely the relative cost of food 
in Spain. An hour' s work in Spanish cities purchased significantly less than it did in 
other western Europe countries , with the exception of Italy. Of the other leading 
European nations, only in France did the low purchasing power of its citizens appear 
to have approached the level of that in Spain and Italy, although basic foods were 
considerably cheaper. 5 
What the Table cannot inform us of course is to what extent the low purchasing power 
of Spanish urban workers was a reflection of expensive food , and to what extent low 
wages . What is not debatable, however, is that the low wages led to poor diets. The 
low calorie intake, and shortage of animal protein in Mediterranean diets in general, 
and the Spanish in particular, is shown in Table 2. 
The question of why diets in Spain were so poor in the 1930s cannot be simply a 
question of the level of economic development. The Irish for example, conswned 23 
per cent more calories per individual , 95 per cent more meat, and 228 per cent more 
sugar, even though real per capita in the two countries was not very different. In the 
rest of this section we shall discuss the possibility of whether tariff protection was 
sufficiently high in Spain to explain the differences noted in Tables 1 and 2. 
4 Palafox, 1991, p.25. For literacy see also Nooez, 1992, ch.2. 
5 In comparison with Spain, French hourly building wages could purchase 31 per 
cent more for white bread or 54 per cent for potatoes. For an international study of 
living standards using this source, see Williamson, 1992. 
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Table 1. RELATIVE PURCHASING POWER OF BUILDING WORKERS IN 
EUROPE, 1930 
quantity that wages from one hour's labour could buy in major cities, in kilos 
and litres 
bread potatoes meat milk sugar 
Spain (4) 1.79 3.93 0.27 1.79 0.73 
Italy (7) 1.48 3.73 0.25 2.19 0.43 
France (4) 2.34 6.04 0.29 2.53 1.07 
Germany (6) 3. 10 11 .82 0.50 4.48 2.10 
Britain (7) 3.40 8.68 0 .71 2.85 2.71 
Austria (3) 2.05 6.58 0.36 2.55 1.23 
Ireland (3) 2.79 13.11 0.64 3.28 2.43 
Low Countries (4) 2.93 13 .67 0.53 4.56 1.74 
Denmark (1) 2.41 12.50 1.14 6.06 4.00 
Sweden (3) 2.37 15 .83 0.89 8.64 4.52 
Estoilla (2) 1.94 6.60 0 .36 2.20 0 .94 
Poland (4) 3.00 12 .27 0.39 2.81 0.83 
Czechoslovakia (3) 3.25 12.21 0 .55 3.77 1.30 
Building workers ' wages have been taken as an average between skilled 
(albafiiles) and unskilled (peones) in the leading urban centres, the number of 
which are given after each country. Bread is from wheat flour , except in the 
case of Austria, Estoilla, Germany and Poland, when rye bread has been used; 
meat refers to an average of beef, lamb, pork and veal, except when 
information is lacking, namely Denmark (Iamb), Britain (veal), Ireland (pork 
and veal) and Sweden (pork) . 
Source: Direcci6n General de Trabajo, 193 1, cuadros Ixiii y lxiv , which in turn 
is based on International Labour Office publications. Information refers to 
January 1930. 
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Table 2 . MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEAN DIETS PRIOR TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR . 
a. annual per capita consumption, kilos . 
cereals (as flour) 
potatoes 
vegetables 
fresh fruit 
sugar 
fats (ex. butter) 
butter 
total fats 
cheese 
milk 
meal 
fish 
eggs 
b. daily per capita consumption. 
calories 
protein -grams 
total calories % from 
cereals & potatoes 
total protein % from 
annimal products 
Austria 
131 .6 
96 .3 
57 .8 
41.6 
24.7 
14.3 
3.0 
17.3 
3.7 
185.8 
48 .7 
3.5 
6.7 
2940 
88 
49 
51 
Belgium 
114.4 
156.1 
49.3 
28 .0 
26.4 
11.8 
7.3 
19.1 
5.7 
79 .8 
47 .2 
14.1 
11.8 
2820 
83 
50 
42 
buter and fats refer to fat content; meat to carcase weight. 
Source : Yates, 1960, Table 2.4. 
Denmark France 
93 .9 
120.0 
58 .0 
30.1 
50.5 
19.6 
7.0 
26.6 
5.4 
166.7 
74 .6 
32 .4 
7.5 
3450 
93 
33 
61 
123.7 
143.2 
143.2 
29.4 
24 .3 
11.2 
4.4 
15.6 
6.4 
85.5 
55 .2 
14.7 
9.0 
2880 
96 
51 
43 
Gennany Greece 
113.0 
187.0 
51.9 
42.0 
26 .3 
14.3 
6.7 
21.0 
4.4 
138.6 
52.8 
14.1 
7.4 
3040 
85 
47 
51 
163.0 
13.6 
27 .0 
49 .0 
10.9 
13.8 
0.9 
14.7 
8.5 
42.0 
19.5 
12.4 
4.2 
2600 
84 
61 
27 
Ireland 
131.4 
195.4 
53.2 
19.5 
38 .1 
2.9 
10.6 
13.5 
0.3 
146.6 
54 .9 
6.5 
15.8 
3400 
99 
50 
48 
Italy 
160.4 
36.6 
55 .8 
33.7 
7.9 
10.6 
1.1 
11.7 
5.3 
37.3 
20 .1 
11.8 
7.3 
2520 
77 
65 
29 
Netherlands 
106.9 
116.0 
67 .0 
38 .3 
32.0 
15.4 
5.2 
20 .6 
6.3 
145.9 
37 .5 
15.3 
9 .1 
2840 
81 
44 
51 
Norway Portugal 
119.0 
130.0 
19.3 
31.0 
36.9 
18.6 
6.3 
24.9 
6 .7 
175.9 
37 .9 
40.6 
6 .9 
3200 
90 
44 
54 
104 .6 
76.2 
109.7 
40.5 
10.2 
13.9 
0.4 
14.3 
0 .9 
8.9 
15.0 
38 .3 
3.2 
2100 
58 
56 
34 
Spain 
146.4 
109.4 
114.6 
57.0 
11.6 
14.4 
0.3 
14.7 
1.5 
60.6 
28 .1 
25.0 
4.9 
2760 
88 
59 
28 
Switzerland UK 
109.5 
90 .5 
61.9 
84 .0 
38 .6 
10.2 
5.3 
15.5 
8.1 
244 .3 
53 .2 
2.9 
8.8 
3140 
96 
39 
56 
95 .3 
82.5 
54.5 
41 .7 
44 .5 
12.1 
9.2 
21.3 
4.0 
107.3 
62 .6 
20 .6 
12.8 
3110 
80 
35 
55 
If from the late nineteenth century Spain was not alone in protecting its wheat 
growers, levels were considered exceptionally high, and helped produce some of 
Europe's highest bread prices. To compare the real. level of protection between 
countries is notoriously difficult, given the variety of methods that protection might 
take, problems in converting currencies, and the significant dietary variations between 
countries. Comparing tariff levels alone is not enough.6 The real level of protection 
that Spanish farmers enjoyed is perhaps best reflected in Table 3, which shows the 
country to have been virtually self-sufficient in wheat in comparison to other 
countries, which had theoretically higher levels of protection according to Liepmann. 7 
Domestic self-sufficiency in wheat was achieved at a cost to the consumer, as domestic 
prices remained above international ones. Graph 1 compares the internal wheat price 
in Spain with the English price, which is taken as the "world price" , and has been 
converted into pesetas at the current exchange rate .8 Whereas between 1870-77 
Spanish wheat prices were cheaper than "world" prices, this would not be the case for 
the rest of the period. Only during the First World W'dl·, when British prices rose on 
account of shipping difficulties, would the price difference fall much below 20 per 
cent. 
6 For example, Spain supplemented its import tariffs from November 1921 by 
strict import quotas for wheat and maize and , therefore, in the words of Liepmann, 
"Spain's corn duties ... had only limited practical value for judging her corn-import 
policy, and the large decreases of her corn imports in post-War periods". Liepmann, 
1938, p.101. For Spanish tariff policy see EPAPM 1928, pp.257-60 and Montojo 
Sureda, 1945, pp. 15-47. 
7 The I.I.A . does not allow a figure for 1909113 to be calculated as the figures for 
production refer to post World War I boundaries , whilst imports to those before the 
War. 
8 As much of wheat consumed in Britain was imported, there is not need to 
include freight in the calculation. Unlike GEHR (1980), who showed the costs (and 
profits) of shipping from England to Barcelona, our interest here is simply to illustrate 
the price "gap" between the two countries. A moving three year price average is used. 
For a wider comparison of international wheat prices between 1880 and 1905, see 
Palafox, 1991 , cuadro 1. 3. 
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-Table 3. INDICES OF WHEAT PRO TECTION IN FIVE EUROPEAN 
IMPORTING NATIONS, 1925/9 
(1) (2) (3) 
Spain 96 .9 % 19.6% 19.2 % 
France 86.2 % 23 .0 % 7.8% 
Germany* 83 .9% 29.0 % 8.0 % 
Italy 74.0 % 27.0 % 5.6 % 
Great Britain 21.2 % 9.2 % 
(1) Level of self-sufficiency in whe at. *Includes both wheat and rye . The 
was 61.3 % and rye 99.7 %. level of wheat self-sufficiency 
Source: I.I.A. various years 
(2) Liepmann, (1938) figures for I 927 
(3) Income from customs receipts as a % of total imports . Refers to period 
1922-30. Tena, 1992, p. 333 
Spain was obviously not alone in protect mg its wheat farmers . Other countries, such 
as France or Germany, also protected 
high agricultural productivity. In the cas 
their farmers but they also enjoyed relatively 
e of France, Lindert has shown that the silver 
nt higher than in England during the 1870s, 
Os and 1900s. In other words, not so very 
price of wheat grew from being 5 per ce 
to around 26 or 27 per cent by the 189 
different from the Spanish experience. 9 Finally, Lindert also reminds us that the 
price of wheat from around 1710 to 1846 
an countries . Indeed, the gap between Britain 
appears remarkably similar to that identified 
'world price". 1O It hardly needs mentioning 
ally considered one of agricultural failure in 
read prices caused by tariff protection could 
English Corn Laws kept the domestic 
significantly above that of other Europe 
and other countries in this earlier period 
in our Graph 1, between Spain and the ' 
that the period 1710-1 846 is not norm 
England. It seems unlikely that higher b 
9 Lindert, 1991 , Table 2.4. 
10 Ibid. Table 2.4. 
6 
GRAPH 1 
160 
140 
120 
~ 100 
.Q 
Q) 
~ 80 .... 
0 
Q) 
> 60 0 
~ 
ItS 
?ft 40 
20 
0 
-20 
1870 
Spanish wheat price as 
percentage of ·'worldll price. 
1880 1890 1900 
Figures given as 3 year averages . 
Sources: prices , Mitchell, 1962, GEHR, 1980 and Paris Eguilaz , 1943. Exchange rates , Carreras 
(ed), pp .390-1. 
make a really significant difference to household budgets in Spain in the period 1891-
1936.11 However, even if cereal protection in Spain was not significantly above that 
of its neighbours, the low incomes of the country implied that its relative impact on 
aggregate demand would be greater than, in say Germany or France. Bread inevitably 
had a greater weight in the family budget of the lower income countries of the 
Mediterranean. 
2. Tariffs and the allocation of resources within agriculture 
It follows that the best policy for European countries during the Great 
Depression was to carry out a shift from crop production to livestock. 
Countries which were able and far-sighted enough to do this stood a 
much better chance of overcoming the crisis that those which, in the face 
of the new trends , persevered with former habits . 12 
The discussion in this section is centred on three main areas .13 First, we examine 
the nature of tariffs, and argue that they only formed part of a wider strategy for 
maintaining favourable domestic terms of trade for cereal farmers. Second, we 
consider who benefited from tariffs within agriculture. Finally, we discuss to what 
extent it would have been possible to reallocate resources more efficiently within 
Spanish agriculture in the pre Civil War period. 
As Sanchez Albornoz has shown, from 1820 government policy successfully reserved 
the internal and colonial markets for domestic cereal producers .14 However, by the 
1880s the impact of falling production costs in the new temperate countries and the 
decline in rail and sea freight, threatened to dislodge the Spanish Interior from its 
11 Fraile, 1993 . 
12 Tracy, 1989, p.19. 
13 As we concern ourselves essentially with wheat, comments are limited to areas 
of dry farming. 
14 Sanchez Albornoz, 1966. See also Nadal, 1985, pp.93-4. 
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traditional markets of the periphery (Barcelona, Valencia etc.). If Spanish prices 
remained relatively stable, world prices fell and the tariff would now effectively 
provide farmers with a minimwn price, ending the higher prices farmers had 
traditionally enjoyed after a harvest failure . 15 In Spain, as elsewhere, this had 
serious implications as greater stability in prices produced greater instability in farm 
incomes, on account of harvest fluctuations . The First World War saw an extension 
in government intervention, with attempts to fix maximwn and rninimwn prices. 16 
By the end of the War, Spain had become virtually self sufficient in wheat and the 
tariff was supplemented from November 1921 by strict import quotas, and maximwn 
and minimum prices were set within the country. In only three years between 1922 
and 1935 did imports rise above 5 per cent of the national harvest (1928, 1929 and 
1932) , being negligible in the rest. J7 Despite the dubious success in becoming self-
sufficient in wheat and stabilizing conswner prices , the clamour for still greater 
protection and reports of distress amongst thousands of wheat farmers during the 
1920s, questions this as a suitable policy measure, a point examined elsewhere . 18 
High bread prices brought complaints from industrialists but, as the farming lobby 
believed, and especially after the First World War, the protection that farmers 
received was often less than that received by industry. The result was , according to 
Torres , that relative prices moved against farmers , benefiting industry (as well as flour 
15 The tariff of 4.54 ptas/100 kilos was increased in December 1891 to 8 ptas and 
again to 10.5 ptas. in February 1895. It then tended to fall, but with higher levels 
becoming operation if the domestic wheat price fe ll below certain levels . See EPAPM 
abril 1928, no.1529, pp .257-60. 
16 The Real decree of August 1914 allowed , briefly, imported wheat to enter duty 
free if prices remained above 29 ptas .l lOO kilos . This was reintroduced between 
March and June, and November of 1915. Final ly, the Real Orden of January 1916 
established duty free imports until April 1921. Maximwn and minimum prices for 
wheat were introduced in November 1915. 
17 Montojo Sureda, 1945 . See also PiniUa Navarro , 1992, ppAI8-20. 
18 See Simpson, forthcoming . 
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rnillers) .19 In the absence of a comprehensive list of conswner and industrial prices , 
it is difficult to show whether Torres was correct or not. Table 4 suggests that 
whereas wheat farmers were less successful than industry to increase prices during the 
War time inflation, the relatively high wheat prices of 1927/9 allowed them to recover 
against most other producers , with the notable exceptions of cotton textiles and 
cement. It would seem that this was only temporary as by 1933/5 wheat was slipping 
back against most other commodities . However, if relative prices did move against 
the farmer between 1913-1935, the movement was slight and limited by government 
price intervention. 
Table 4. MOVEMENTS IN COMMODITY PRICES IN SPAIN, 1913-1935 
1913/5 1920/22 1927/9 1933/ 
35 
wheat 100 172 156 152 
flour 100 168 155 153 
woollen textiles 100 177 157+ 
cotton textiles 100 250 225+ 
cement 100 186 190 192 
steel 100 385 143 196 
iron 100 360 141 165 
sulphuric acid 100 193 173 lID 
Asturian coal 100 419 154 175 
petrol 100 155 74 98 
superphosphates 100 276 122 145 
sugar 100 241 171 177 
coffee 100 151 195 217 
+ 1927 and 1928.Source: Carreras, 1989 and Paris Eguilaz, 1943 . 
19 See, for example, Torres, 1934, p.231. 
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Peter Lindert has stressed that governments in recent decades frequently distort their 
economies by anti-trade policies , as governments "tend to tax exportable-good 
agriculture and protect import-competing agriculture" . 20 In this respect Spain does 
not appear to have been very different from most other countries. Spanish producers 
of oranges, olive oil, olives, wine, grapes , raisins, soft fruits , nuts, early vegetables 
all suffered to some degree as they had to pay higher prices for wheat, meat, rice , 
sugar, machinery and consumer goods because of import duties. Whilst it is true that 
most export crops were protected themselves from imports in the domestic market, it 
seems unlikely that they would have faced any serious competition without this 
protection 2 1 
Finally we have to consider whether tariffs delayed the switch out of cereals and into 
other crops. This is especially important, as it has been argued that the high 
concentration of resources in cereals was a major cause of Spanish agriculrure's low 
productivity. We shall consider this from two angles, first the question of lost export 
opportunities and second, the delay in transferring resources to livestock farming, as 
suggested was needed by Tracy, quoted above . We shall argue that, rather than a 
misguided tariff policy, it was lack of alternative crops to cereals, in contrast to 
elsewhere in western Europe, that was the principal obstacle to change. 
In the absence of irrigation, the major alternative crops to cereals in Spain were vines 
and olives. By the first third of the twentieth century increased demand in the 
domestic market was dependent mainly on population growth, with per capita 
consumption growing by just 8.3 per cent in the case of olive oil , and falling by lA 
per cent for wine, between 1897/0 1 and 1929/33.22 Both crops had important export 
20 Lindert, 1991 , p.29. 
21 One important exception is the question of substitutes. In this respect wine 
producers benefited from taxes on imported cheap alcohols, which could have be used 
as a base for the production of other drinks , and olive oil producers from taxes on 
imports of edible vegetable oils. 
22 Simpson, 1989, cuadro 5. 
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markets , and it is in this area that we shall look for lost opportunities because of the 
protected cereal market. 
The vine was Spain' s major export crop throughout the period.23 The intensive 
nature of viticulture made it well suited to the small family farms of the Mediterranean 
area, and the lack of capital often associated with peasant farming was alleviated in 
the pre-phylloxera period by the fact that off-farm inputs were minimal . Low entry 
costs and extensive areas of suitable land for its cultivation were offset only by the 
bulky nature of the product, and its perishability , as most wines in their natural state 
frequently became undrinkable within a few months of production. The railways 
helped lift the geographic restrictions on production, and the addition of alcohol to the 
wine greatly increased the product's life. 
Spanish exports grew rapidly from the early 1870s on account of the severely 
diminished harvests in France, caused by phyl\oxera (Table 5). Yet the boom was 
short lived. By the turn of the twentieth century, replanting with disease resistant 
varieties had allowed French domestic output to virtually recover. 24 Without the 
benefit of an abnormal short-fall in a major producing country , Spanish growers 
needed either to increase market share, or to extend the size of the market. They 
failed to do either, and the country 's share of the world trade in wine slipped from 
approximately half in the 1880s to less than a quarter by 1925-9. 
23 At its peak in 1880-4, 45 per cent of all exports were products of the vine 
(Prados de la Escosura 1982, p.41) . 
24 For Spanish viticulture in the late nineteenth century, see especially Camero i 
Arbat, 1980. 
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TABLE 5. EXPORTS OF SPANISH BULK WINES 
Total Exports Exports % to Spanish Index 
Exports to to other France wine exports 
France countries price by value 
1861-65 88.7 9.9 78 .8 11 23.2 100 
1866-70 111 .5 13 .0 98.5 12 19.4 105 
1871-75 160.6 30.8 129.8 19 20.2 158 
1876-80 302.4 180 .1 122.2 60 26 .0 382 
188 1-85 682.7 547.9 134.8 80 35.5 1178 
1886-90 825 .6 698 .0 127.6 85 26.0 1043 
1891-95 636.4 444.5 191.9 70 16.5 510 
1896-00 534.6 372.0 162.6 70 19 .3 501 
1901 -05 208.4 143.3 65 .1 69 20.7 210 
1906-10 140.1 42.7 97.4 30 15 .8 108 
1911-15 269 .9 141.8 128. 1 53 27.4 359 
1916-20 445 .5 275 .7 169.8 62 30.4 658 
1921-25 278.6 166.2 112.4 60 23.2 314 
exports in millions of litres. Wine price refers to San Pere de Ribes 
(Barcelona) . Index of exports obtained by mUltiplying total exports by wine 
price; 186 1-65 = 100. 
Source: Estadistica (s) de Comercio Exterior and Balcell s 1980, 
pp.375-9. 
A major problem facing Spanish producers was that the world market for cheap table 
wines outside France would remain limited. In part this was because producer 
countries restricted imports to protect domestic growers , and in part because non-
producers frequently placed very high tariffs on wines to protect other domestically 
produced alcoholic drinks. Even if Spanish growers had managed to improve product 
13 
quality and establish brand names , which a few producers did, it is unlikely that they 
would have widened the market significantly .25 
On the supply side, if producers appear to have responded quickly to an outward 
movement of the demand curve, they found it less easy to reduce output in periods of 
depressed demand, as taking vines out of production implied the destruction of costly 
assets . However, there appears to have been other factors which strictly limited long 
term profits in viticulture, as wine producers in the pre-phylloxera period experienced 
conditions not dissimilar to those faced by tropical agricultural producers at this time, 
namely low entry costs and elastic supplies of land and labour.26 Phylloxera raised 
entry costs by demanding greater inputs of skilled labour and capital, but much of the 
world 's overproduction of wine during the first third of the twentieth century stemmed 
from the extension of vines in regions such as central Spain and Algeria, where the 
crops opportunity costs were low, and phylloxera's presence minimal .z' Finally , as 
alcohol produced from grapes was more expensive than that produced from other 
sources, product adulteration remained a major problem, especially when wine prices 
showed a tendency to rise. 
In conclusion, short term price rises encouraged low cost producers to extend the area 
of cultivation in regions such as La Mancha in Spain, which tended to quickly reduce 
25 In France, for example, the exports of quality wines declined from roughly 60 
per cent of production of vins de cm in 1869-77, to 30 per cent in 1913, and 10 per 
cent in 1939. Warner 1960, p.85. 
26 For tropical producers, see Lewis 1978, especially Chapter 7. 
27 Opportunity costs are difficult to measure, although for La Mancha (taken as 
Albacete, Ciudad Real , Cuenca and Toledo) wheat yields averaged only 0.6 tones per 
hectare in 1909/1914 (Torres 1944, pp.247-272), against a national average of 0.9 in 
all Spain, 0.7 in Algeria, 1.1 in Italy, 1.3 in France and 2.2 in the British Isles 
(calculated from Malenbaum 1953, pp.236-239). Lewis notes a figure of 700Ib per 
acre (0.8 tones per hectare) for tropical countries in 1900 (1978, p.188) . In some 
regions of Algeria and central Spain, phylloxera was still absent in the 1920s. See 
Sirnpson, forthcoming. 
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price levels. In general, world viticulture experienced considerable difficulties in the 
period 1900-1950, caused by the ease of planting vines in the large areas of the 
Mediterranean, areas where land was plentiful and wage labour was cheap.28 
Finally, as wines were exported strengthen in alcohol, product quality was low, and 
the value added tended to be minimum. 
The olive was another crop of major importance both for the domestic and external 
market, with about a fifth of total output exported in the decade prior to the Civil 
War. Between 1901 -12 and 1926-35, the area under olives grew by a third , 
agricultural yields increased by 28 per cent, but industrial yields in the manufacture 
of olive oil saw virtually no change. These movements in productivity are deceptive 
however, for whilst an important part of the increase in agricultural yields appears to 
have been achieved by simply having a greater proportion of the nation's trees in full 
production, and by farmers increasing annual variable costs (extra ploughings , 
hoeings , greater care in harvesting ,etc .) to take advantage of favourable prices , the 
most significant change in this sector during the period was without doubt the 
modernization of the olive mills and presses . 
In the nineteenth century, most Spanish olive oil exported was of poor quality , and 
used for industrial purposes , namely lighting , as a raw material in the manufacture of 
soap, and as a lubricant for machinery . The growth of other cheaper vegetable 
substitutes implied that, to retain markets , producers had to improve product quality, 
switching from the industrial to edible oil market, which in turn required considerable 
investment in new plant. From a low of 16.7 thousand tons of olive oil exported in 
the decade 1886-95 , exports grew to 74.4 thousand in 1926-35 . However, the six 
major markets for Spanish olive oil between 1865 and 1935, namely Italy , France, 
Cuba, Argentina, United States and Great Britain, illustrate once again the limitations 
of the export market for Spanish producers , as five of the six countries were either 
28 For growth in world output see Pujol Andreu, 1984. 
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Mediterranean countries (and therefore producers themselves) , or had large 
Mediterranean immigrant populations . Market size was therefore limited by taste and 
cultural experiences.29 In addition, from the late nineteenth century producers faced 
increasing competition from other, cheaper vegetable OilS. 30 
Olive oil processing required a cash investment which could not be easily substituted 
by labour and which, by allowing economies of scale, gave the larger producer an 
advantage over the smaller one. This led to a greater concentration of production as 
small producers sold their fruit to the larger manufacturer. 31 However, although the 
technical change in manufacturing increased product quality and opened up new 
markets , the greater part of the value added was obtained in the growing and 
harvesting of the crop. Government estimates in 1921 suggest that only 10 per cent 
of the price of olive oil could be attributed to the manufacturing process .32 Therefore 
90 per cent of the cost of olive oil was based on the use of extensive areas of 
relatively unfertile soil, and some of Europe' s cheapest casual agricultural labour. 
As with the vine, long term growth prospects of the olive were limited as supply could 
easily be increased, in the long term by extending the area of cultivation, and in the 
short term through adulterating the product. These facts, linked to the high levels of 
substitution in the non-Mediterranean countries implied that the olive, as with the vine, 
had a growth potential which depended significantly on the domestic market. In other 
words, it is questionable to what extent a reduction in the area of cereals/legumes 
would have encouraged a movement of resources into these two other crops . 
29 The sixth country, Britain, was of declining importance from the late nineteenth 
century as cheaper vegetable oils were used for industrial purposes. 
30 Zambrana, 1987, ch.7. 
31 For the example of the company Carbonell in C6rdoba, Zambrana, 1987, ch.4 . 
32 Direcci6n General de Agricultura y Montes, 1923 . 
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From the late nineteenth century, a major factor in productivity growth in northern 
European agriculture was the movement of resources away from the production of 
bread cereals, where demand tended to be stagnant and producers faced growing 
international competition, and into other commodities where value added was greater. 
The result was a sizeable increase in the output of meat and dairy products, as 
suggested by Tracy. Thus in Great Britain the area devoted to wheat fell by a half 
and the number of cattle increased by 30 per cent between 1870 and 1910. In France, 
whilst the value of cereals stagnated, the output of meat and dairy produce increased 
by 48 per cent between 1865174 and 1905/ 14. In Italy , the number of cattle 
increased by 40 per cent between 1880 and 1910, and there were significant increases 
in the numbers of pigs, sheep and goats .33 If in Germany there was no fall in the 
area of wheat and rye, the number of cattle rose by third between 1873 and 1913 .34 
In Spain, the situation is harder to establish on account of the lack of reliable censuses 
at the turn of the twentieth century , and the problem of calculating suitable production 
coefficients . In general, however, livestock numbers do not appear so very different 
in 1929 as they were in 1917 or 1865 . 3S By contrast, the area of wheat grew 
throughout most of the nineteenth century , and increased by 24 per cent and 
production by 34 per cent between 1905/9 and 1930/4. 
33 The number of pigs increased by 28 per cent, sheep by 40 per cent and goats 
by 36 per cent, Mitchell, 1992, pp.347-8. 
34 Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, Toutain, 1961 , Statistisches 
lahrbuch for das Deutsche Recish, all cited in Tracy, 1989 pp. 51 , 76 and lOO-\. 
3S Taking the herd size (live weight) to have been 100 in 1865, it was 98 in 1750, 
87 in 1917 and 105 in 1929. Garrabou and Sanz (1985) cuadro 20 and GEHR (1978) 
apendice . One possible source of error is the month when the census was carried out, 
with 1865 (November) being exaggerated in comparison with 1929 and 1933 (March), 
and perhaps the former including the annual new borns, but the latter not (The date 
for the 1917 census is not known GEHR 1991, pp.81 -2). However, as the 1865 census 
includes the number of animals under six months (ie added to the national herd since 
March), and if this category is excluded, then the size of national herd in 1865 was 
not overcome until 1913 in the case of cattle, 1917 swine, 1921 goats, and sheep 
1939. In terms of live weight per person, there still remains a significant fall. 
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There can be few doubts that this failure to switch resources out of bread grains and 
towards meat and dairy produce was a major cause of the low productivity in the 
agricultural sector in Spain. That said, it is much more difficult to establish to what 
extent the failure was the result of tariffs , and to what extent other factors should be 
blamed. 
The question however, is not one of free trade or protection for cereals , as Spanish 
livestock producers also enjoyed strict controls on imports . Population growth, 
improvements in per capita incomes, real wages and growing urbanization over the 
period 1865-1936 might be expected to have produced an increase in demand for 
livestock produce. The virtual stagnation in herd size as shown in the censuses of 
1865, 1917 and 1933 suggests , however, that per capita supply fell . If demand for 
meat was indeed rising faster than supply, then prices would be expected to have risen 
against those of bread. Graph 2 shows that this indeed was the case from mid 1880s, 
with growth being especially strong after the First World War. This also fits with 
what we know about wheat consumption. After growing from an annual 159.4 
kilos/person in 1908/12 to 168.8 in 1918/22, wheat consumption then fell to 150.8 
over the following decade . As early as 1926, Flores de Lemus had noted the growing 
importance of feed grains compared to bread, and suggested that this was the only 
feasible alternative to cereal farmers , given the impossibility of exporting wheat. 36 
The government reacted to rising meat prices by allowing annual imports of 282.8 
thousand tons of maize between 1920-33, the equivalent of 44 per cent of the domestic 
harvest. Nationally farmers were slowly diverting resources into livestock production. 
However, during the first third of the twentieth century urban wages in Madrid 
increased about twice as fast as meat prices , and therefore the stagnation in per capita 
consumption in this city suggests that any improvements in living standards led to the 
36 Flores de Lemus, 1926. See also Jimenez BJanco, 1986 and GEHR, 1988, p.61 . 
18 
GRAPH 2 
WHEAT-MEAT PRICE RATIO IN MADRID 
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purchase of other superior foods or consumer goods, rather than meat.31 In other 
words, even though diets were poor in meat, consumers were not willing to increase 
consumption at any price. The evidence, albeit slight, suggests that low meat 
consumption was primarily a supply problem. 
In conclusion, theoretically lower internal bread prices achieved through a more liberal 
tariff policy might have released more land for feed grains , which could have been 
diverted towards livestock produce. In reality , such a policy is likely to have had 
limited results . And for two reasons . First, whereas the arrival of cheap grain 
allowed a re-orientation of western European agriculture , the possibility in 
Mediterranean, and Spain in particular, were much less . On the secano , which 
covered about four flfths of Spain, natural conditions were inappropriate for intensive 
livestock farming as practised in Europe prior to the Second World War. Second, 
natural pastures were notoriously poor, and artiflcial pastures virtually absent. 38 
Until the development of intensive, stall feeding technologies, which could be adapted 
to Mediterranean type climates , Spain's meat consumption would remain low. 
An alternative policy would have permitted free trade in both grains and livestock 
produce, thereby hastening considerably the rural exodus . If this alternative would 
have been regarded as far fetched by most in the pre Civil War period, evidence 
presented below suggests that the size of the expected rural exodus would have been 
smaller than is often thought today . 
31 Reher and Ballesteros, 1993 , Apendice I and Gomez Mendoza and Simpson, 
1988, Apendice 3. As meat prices are Madrid wholesale prices , it is not clear to what 
extent the increases were reflected in off-farm prices, a point of some importance 
given livestock producers complaints at this time about the inefflency of marketing 
arrangements in Spain. 
38 See especially Tortella, 1992, and Galassi, 1986. In 1931 the area of artiflcial 
pastures in Spain was 374 thousand hectares, or 2.4 per cent of the total . GEHR 
1983a. 
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3. Tariffs: an obstacle to ofT farm migration? 
The belief that tariff policy in Spain slowed the rural exodus has been frequently 
discussed in the literature. Elsewhere I have suggested that there seems to have been 
a widening of the rural-urban wage gap between 1860 and 1896, which then starts 
closing slowly.39 These trends appear compatible with employment figures . Thus 
whereas between 1860 and 1910 approximately two thlrds of the active male labour 
force was found in agriculture, the figures fell to just under half by 1930. 
Furthermore labour productivity in agriculture grew only slowly in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, stagnated between 1891/5 and 1909/13 , and then increased by 
approximately 60 per cent by 1929/33.40 In other words, the relatively high wage 
gap between 1896 and 1914 occurred at a time when agricultural productivity was 
stagnant, and the number of workers in the sector grew between 1887 and 1910 by 16 
per cent.41 
However, more direct information is available to consider the impact of tariffs and 
off-farm migration. According to GEHR, between 1886-90 and 1930-5 the area sown 
with cereals and legumes, crops which benefited directly from protection, grew by 
1.47 million hectares , or 18.3 per cent.42 If tariffs encouraged an increase in output 
which under conditions found in Spain implied an extension in the area cultivated, we 
would expect population to be retained in agriculture in those areas which saw a 
growth in the area cultivated. Table 6, however, suggests no obvious correlation. Of 
the 13 regions given, 7 had increases in the area sown greater than the national 
average and of these, 4 saw a greater decline in the farm population than the national 
39 Simpson, 1995 . 
40 Simpson, 1994. 
41 Nicolau, 1989. 
42 GEHR,1983. 
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Table 6. CHANGES IN AREAS SOWN OF CEREALS-LEGUMES AND 
RURAL POPULATION, 1886-90 AND 1930-5 
% change % change in 
in area fann 
sown population 
Cantabrian Coast +85 .3 -26 .9 
Upper Ebro +58 .2 -16 .7 
La Mancha +35 .7 + 15 .9 
Extremadura +35 .3 +2.4 
Western Andalucia +34.0 +4.0 
Castilla-Leon + 24.8 -24.6 
Baleares +23 .8 -20 .3 
Pais Valenciano +15 .2 -8.2 
Aragon +8 .5 -20.9 
Catalufia +7 .9 -8.5 
Eastern Andalucia +4.3 + 15 .5 
Murcia +0 .9 -18.8 
Galicia -12.1 -11.0 
SPAIN + 18.3 -8.3 
farm population refers to male labour only. 
Regions : Cantabrian Coast (Asturias , Cantabria, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) ; 
Upper Ebro (Alava, Navarra and Rioja) , La Mancha (Albacete, Ciudad Real , 
Cuenca and Toledo) , Extremadura (Badajoz and Caceres); Western Andalucia 
(Cadiz, Cordoba, Huelva and Sevilla); Castilla-Leon (Avila, Burgos, 
Guadalajara, Leon, Madrid, Palencia, Salamanca, Segovia, Soria, Valladolid 
and Zamora) ; Pais Valenciano (Alicante, Castellon and Valencia) , Aragon 
(Huesca, Teruel and Zaragoza) , Catalufia (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and 
Tarragona) ; Eastern Andalucfa (Almeria, Jaen, Granada and Malaga) and 
Galicia (Corufia, Lugo, Pontevedra and Orense). 
Sources : GEHR 1983 and Censos de poblacion. 
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average. Of the remaining 6 regions, 4 saw a greater population decline than the 
country as a whole. In particular, it is worth highlighting the case of Castilla-Le6n 
which saw a growth of 25 per cent in the area sown, but a fall of the same amount in 
the size of the farm population. 
There was, however, one large region where it does appear that the growth in the area 
cultivated was accompanied by a growth in population, namely La Mancha, Western 
Andalucfa and Badajoz. Here the area sown increased by a third (or the equivalent 
to just over half the national increase), whilst population grew by II per cent. If the 
impact of other crops (viticulture in La Mancha, olives in Andalucfa) partly explain 
these changes, cereal tariffs probably also helped retain labour. Yet if this is correct, 
this poses a paradox, as it implies that in areas of small farms cereal tariffs 
encouraged both an extension in the area cultivated which was accompanied by a 
significant fall in farm population; by contrast, it would be in the areas of large estates 
and day labourers, in the south of the country , where the extension in cultivation 
would be accompanied by a growth in the labour force .43 Clearly, something other 
than just the price of wheat was determining the rate of off-farm migration . 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to question the importance of tariff protection for cereals, 
especially wheat, in explaining the backward nature of Spanish agriculture. In the first 
instance we accept that Spain in 1936 was a poor country and, despite obvious changes 
in the economy, not least in the agricultural sector itself, diets were poor in 
comparison to other European nations . Second, if tariffs pushed cereal prices higher 
than those on the international market, the difference between Spain and France or 
Germany, was small. However, whereas farmers in these two other countries reacted 
to cheap imports both by protection and by switching resources into other 
commodities , this was not in general the case in Spain. The area of cereal-legumes 
43 See especially Bemal, 1985. 
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in Spain, far from declining actually grew in the half century prior to the Civil War. 
Furthennore, within this figure, the area sown with feed grains grew only slowly 
compared to other countries. This was due not to the inefficiency of Spanish farmers , 
or the greater levels of cereal protection that they enjoyed, but rather the technical 
difficulties in introducing high-value crops , or intensive livestock farming systems 
prior to the 1960s. 
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